Communications in Theoretical Physics ›› 2020, Vol. 72 ›› Issue (11): 115102. doi: 10.1088/1572-9494/abb7d8

• Quantum Physics and Quantum Information • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Quantum key distribution system against the probabilistic faint after-gate attack

Meng Ye1,Jian-Hui Li1,Yong Wang1,Peng Gao1,Xin-Xin Lu1,Yong-Jun Qian2,()   

  1. 1 Power Generation Company, GuangZhou 510700, China
    2 Anhui Qasky Quantum Technology Co., Ltd., Wuhu 241102, China
  • Received: 2020-05-20 Revised: 2020-09-10 Accepted: 2020-09-10 Published: 2020-11-01
  • Contact: Yong-Jun Qian E-mail:yjqian@mail.ustc.edu.cn

Abstract:

In practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, a single photon-detector (SPD) is one of the most vulnerable components. Faint after-gate attack is a universal attack against the detector. However, the original faint after-gate attack can be discovered by monitoring the photocurrent. This paper presents a probabilistic generalization of the attack, which we refer to as probabilistic faint after-gate attack, by introducing probability control modules. Previous countermeasures for photocurrent monitoring may fail in detecting the eavesdropper under some specific probabilities. To mitigate this threat, we provide a method to determine the detectable boundary in the limitation of precision of photocurrent monitoring, and investigate the security of QKD systems under such boundaries using the weak randomness model.

Key words: quantum key distribution, practical security, single photon-detector, weak randomness model